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The Right to Strike for Pennsylvania's Public
Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramifications for
the Public Employer
Kurt H. Decker*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade many changes in the governmental process
have occurred, not the least of which has been the introduction of
public sector collective bargaining. The procedure of collective bar-
gaining is not new. What is new, however, is that formal collective
bargaining negotiations have now become an integral part of public
sector employment. No longer are public employees isolated indi-
viduals dealing with employers. Increasingly, public employers con-
front employees united in an organization and deal with those em-
ployees through a new set of relationships circumscribed by collec-
tive bargaining.
It is essential in understanding public sector collective bargaining
to recognize the context in which it exists in the private and public
sectors. The early 1930's witnessed a period of labor unrest charac-
terized by strikes, work stoppages, and slowdowns which threatened
to close industries. To counteract this unrest, Congress passed the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).I Since the NLRA's passage,
private sector employees have been accorded organization and bar-
gaining rights with their employers on "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 2 By 1937, Pennsylvania
labor's right to collectively bargain was generally protected by fed-
eral legislation in the NLRA, and by state legislation in the Pennsyl-
vania Labor Relations Act (PLRA). 3 Public employees, however,
* B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt University;
Ass't Att'y General, Pennsylvania Governor's Office, Bureau of Labor Relations; Member,
Pennsylvania Bar. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Pennsylvania Governor's Office, Bureau of Labor Relations.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970).
2. Id. § 152(2).
3. The Act of June 1, 1937, Pub. L. No. 294 (Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act), estab-
lished rights for private sector employees in Pennsylvania to organize and bargain collectively
through selected representatives. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.13 (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1977-78) [hereinafter referred to as PLRA].
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were specifically excluded from these statutes' coverage,' since their
inclusion was thought to violate public policy due to the danger
posed to the general welfare.5
With the growth of governmental employment, it was perhaps
inevitable that public employees would demand the same rights as
their private sector counterparts. Federal and state governments
could hardly deny to all their employees that which had been al-
ready granted and defended as being applicable to the private sec-
tor.' Moreover, the rapid development of public sector unions made
it imperative that federal and state governments originate policies
balancing the needs and aspirations of public employees with their
particular employment characteristics. In the past decade, the
Pennsylvania legislature granted public employees collective bar-
gaining rights. Act 111, 7 enacted in 1968, generally provides for
collective bargaining between police and firemen and their public
employers. Act 195,8 passed in 1970, provides for comprehensive
collective bargaining by all other public employees.
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) was expressly
given jurisdiction to administer labor relations involving public
employees covered by Act 195.1 However, the PLRB's jurisdiction
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (term "employer" as used in the statute does not include a state
or political subdivision thereof); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.3(c) (term "employer" as used
in the statute does not include the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a political subdivision
thereof).
5. It was considered to be part of the American tradition that there was "no right to strike
against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611,
614, 88 A.2d 878, 880 (1952). Cf. De Blasia v. Cecil Township, 42 Wash. County 193, 28 Pa.
D. & C.2d 450 (1963) (strikes by public employees might cripple an important governmental
function to the detriment of the public at large); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964),
partially repealed by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78) (prohibits
strikes by public employees).
6. Blair, State Legislative Control Over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining
the Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1,
3 (1973).
7. The Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 111 (Collective Bargaining by Police and Fire-
men's Act), established the rights for police and firemen to organize and bargain collectively
through selected representatives. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78)
[hereinafter referred to as Act 1111.
8. All Pennsylvania public employees other than police and firemen were given the right
to organize and bargain collectively by the Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. No. 195, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78) [hereinafter referred to as Act 195j.
9. Id. § 1101.501. In Pennsylvania, the legislature established a specialized agency for
administering private and public sector collective bargaining statutes. The PLRA created the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) and charged it with administering private
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was never specifically extended to Act 111. Thus, Act 111 has func-
tioned without an agency to administer its provisions, and disputes
over the Act's application and interpretation have been referred
directly to the courts for resolution. 0 Recently the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court altered this situation" by finding Act 111 to be in
pari material'2 with the PLRA and conferring limited jurisdiction
upon the PLRB to conduct police and firemen representation elec-
tions.
This article deals with one aspect of public sector collective bar-
gaining: the right of Pennsylvania's public employees' to strike.
Among the areas examined are'the impact of private labor rulings
on Pennsylvania's public employee laws, public sector strikes and
their implications, and Pennsylvania's public employee laws and
the right to strike. Pennsylvania's public employee laws will be
specifically analyzed regarding the scope of the right to strike, pro-
hibited strikes, injunctive relief, employee compensation during
strikes, picketing and other concerted activities, no-strike clauses,
and teacher strikes.
1I. PRIVATE SECTOR LABOR RULING'S IMPACT ON PENNSYLVANIA'S
PuBLic EMPLOYEE LAWS
Since collective bargaining is still a relatively new concept in the
public sector, a paucity of decisions covering key public sector issues
exists. Case law in any jurisdiction may. be limited since public
sector labor relations are regulated by individual state or local stat-
utes, court decisions, executive orders, and attorney general opin-
ions.' 3 The applicability of case law from one state to another may
sector labor relations. Id. § 211.4. In 1970, the legislature extended the PLRB's jurisdiction
in Act 195 to include all public employees, except police and firemen. Id. § 1101.501.
10. See, e.g., Hartshorn v. Allegheny County, 460 Pa. 560, 333 A.2d 914 (1975); Allegheny
County v. Venneri, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 105 (1972), appeal after remand, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct.
517, 316 A.2d 120 (1974).
11. Philadephia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259
(1977); see Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Police and Firemen, 16 DuQ. L. REv.
185 (1978).
12. In pari materia is a statutory interpretation technique whereby a statute's legislative
intent, when ambiguous from the language, is gleaned from other statutes dealing with the
same subject matter. See generally, 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUmoN §§
51.01-08 (4th ed. 1973).
13. At least 45 states provides some form of collective bargaining for either all or a portion
of their public employees. [19771 51 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501.
1978-79
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be restricted due to the variance in collective bargaining laws." On
the other hand, precedent is virtually unlimited in the private sector
since the NLRA is interpreted through a centralized agency, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Several public sector tribunals have relied on private sector pre-
cedents.'" This reliance is predicated on the rationale that the statu-
tory language in both sectors often coincides, thus providing relia-
ble, if not analogous, authority. Many public sector employment
boards and reviewing courts therefore consider private sector pre-
cedents.'1 Of course, blind deference is unwarranted unless the legis-
lature intended the statute to be so construed."
Public sector issues cannot be interpreted solely by reference to
the private sector as the Pennsylvania courts point out." In Pennsyl-
vania, private sector precedent "may provide some guidance," but
it is also necessary to consider "the distinctions that necessarily
must exist between legislation primarily directed to the private sec-
tor and that for public employees."' 9
III. PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Unlike the private sector, where the strike is generally accepted
14. See Drachman & Ambash, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions
Worthwhile in Public Sector Labor Relations?-A Management Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDuc.
209 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal.3d 608, 526 P.2d
971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 392 Mich. 44,
214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 278 N.E.2d 387 (1972).
16. See Kahn, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public
Sector Labor Relations?-The Perspective of a Neutral, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 221 (1977).
17. For example, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act provides that the Agri-
cultural Labor Relations Board "shall follow applicable precedents of the National Labor
Relations Acts as amended." CAL. (LAB.) CODE § 1148 (West 1977).
18. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Emp., AFL-CIO, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 348 A.2d 921 (1975); Borough of Wilkinsburg v.
Sanitation Dept. of Borough of Wilkinsburg, 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975); State College
Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973), aff'd,
461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
19. State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. L.R.B., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973),
aff'd, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also stated:
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the experience gained in the private
sector is of no value here, rather we are stressing that analogies have limited applica-
tion and the experience gained in the private employment sector will not necessarily
provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employment.
337 A.2d at 264-65.
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as the "motive power for agreement," the public sector has resisted
legitimizing such activity. In the private sector, the strike is utilized
by the union as an economic weapon. A threatened or actual strike
by public employees may, however, have more than economic con-
sequences. Public employees may utilize the strike's potential polit-
ical consequences as leverage to gain their objectives. The effective-
ness of a strike at the bargaining table will depend upon the import-
ance to the community of the service to be interrupted, the political
cohesiveness and importance of the clientele to be deprived of the
service, and the extent to which these consumers-taxpayers-voters
can exert pressure on the employer to reach a settlement.2"
To date, most states have not accepted the right of public employ-
ees to strike' and the majority deny public employees a strike right
either by statute or by judicial fiat. There are some notable depar-
20. Thus a strike by police may be effective, while a librarian's strike may be a disaster
for the employees. The effectiveness of a strike may depend upon the services' essential
character and the power the public employee group can exert on the employer.
For commentary on this question see generally Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector
Interest Arbitration, 64 CAL. L. REv. 678 (1976); Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector
Bargaining, 1973 Wisc. L. REv. 986; Blair, State Legislative Control Over the Conditions of
Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal
Employees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1973); Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public
Sector, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 885 (1973); Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 47 (1973); McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A
New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192
(1972); Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 887 (1972); Bernstein, Alternative to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 459 (1971); Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government Labor
Relations, 30 MD. L. REv. 179 (1970); Ross, The Arbitration of Public Employee Wage
Disputes, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3 (1970); Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences
of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Kheel, Strikes and Public
Employment, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 931 (1969); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective
Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
21. The following have been cited as reasons for opposing the strike right: (1) the public
employer's sovereignty; (2) economic considerations of the private sector are not present in
the public sector; (3) difficulty of the public employer to use a lockout; (4) the wrong party
is injured; (5) indispensibility of governmental services; (6) strikes of essential industries in
the private sector are also illegal; and (7) public sector unions possess too much political
power. On the other hand, proponents argue: (1) the sovereignty doctrine has been eroded;
(2) not all governmental services are essential; (3) public employees will strike despite legisla-
tion or court decisions to the contrary; (4) employers will be encouraged to bargain; and (5)
strikes in the private sector are more disruptive than public sector strikes. For a more thor-
ough discussion of these views see Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes
by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 420-22 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108-11, 1125-27 (1969).
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tures. Alaska,2 Hawaii," Minnesota,24 Montana, 5 Oregon, 26 Penn-
sylvania,2 and Vermont28 permit all or some of their public employ-
ees the strike right after certain conditions have been
met-including the requirement that the strike does not harm the
general health, welfare, or safety of the public.
The question of whether strikes should be allowed by all or some
public employees is not susceptible to a simple solution. The prob-
lem is that the strike right, where it is allowed, is granted to those
employees who may least desire it while denying it to those who may
most want it. The real value of a strike is in the withholding of
essential services, but typically these are linked to the public's
health, safety, or welfare. Therefore, even in states permitting
strikes, withholding essential services such as fire or police protec-
tion would be enjoinable.
IV. PENNSYLVANIA'S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LAWS AND THE RIGHT TO
STRIKE
Pennsylvania's public sector labor relations is controlled by two
statutes: the Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195) which governs
labor relations for all public employees except police and firemen, 9
and the Collective Bargaining by Police and Firemen's Act (Act 111)
which covers that group.30 Each law involves different parameters
regarding the existence and limitations of strike right.
A. Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195)31
1. Scope
Act 195 establishes rights in all public employees, except police
and firemen, to organize and bargain collectively through selected
representatives. Its purpose is to promote orderly and constructive
22. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1977).
23. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1976).
24. MINNESOTA STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (West Supp. 1977).
25. MONTANA REv. CODES ANN. 59-1603 (Supp. 1977). See State Department of Highways
v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974).
26. OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1977).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
28. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1730 (Supp. 1977).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
30. Id. §§ 217.1-.10.
31. Id. §§ 1101.101-,2301.
Vol. 17: 3-4
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relationships between public employers and their employees.2 Act
195's statutory language is patterned after much of the NLRA. In
interpreting Act 195, the private sector may provide some guidance,
but it is not controlling.3
Act 195 altered prior Pennsylvania law by granting public em-
ployees a right to strike.34 However, this is a limited right occurring
only after the exhaustion of certain statutory impasse procedures
and not all public employees are given this right." Those that are
permitted to strike do not enjoy a right to strike that is identical to
that of the private sector. 31
The definition of "strike '37 covers all Act 195 strikes whether legal
or not. A legal or permissible Act 195 strike is one by public employ-
ees, who are statutorily accorded that right, which commences after
impasse procedures for permitting such activity are exhausted.U All
other strikes are illegal strikes."'
2. Prohibited Strikes by Certain Employees
Act 195 excludes certain public employees from exercising any
strike right. It prohibits strikes by guards at prisons or mental hospi-
tals, or employees directly involved with and necessary to the
court's functioning.40
32. Hollinger v. Department of Public Welfare, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 348 A.2d 161
(1975).
33. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1010 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78); see also note 5
supra.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1010 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
36. In the private sector the strike right exists absent the constraints imposed in the
public sector. For a discussion of the private sector strike right and its parameters see THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 517-34 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
37. Act 195 defines "strike" as:
[C]oncerted action in failing to report for duty, the willful absence from one's posi-
tion, the stoppage of work, slowdown, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the
full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of
inducing, influencing, or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the
rights, privileges, or obligations of employment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(9) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
38. Id. § 1101.1001-.1003.
39. Examples of illegal strikes are those occurring by employees not accorded the right;
prior to the existence of any collective bargaining agreement; during the existence of any
collective bargaining agreement; or prior to exhausting the impasse procedure to be followed
before beginning a legal strike. Id.
40. Id. §§ 1101.1001. A guard is generally any individual employed to enforce against
employees and other persons, rules to protect the employer's property or to protect the safety
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 17: 3-4
Should an illegal strike by guards or court personnel occur, the
public employer must initiate in the appropriate court of common
pleas an action for equitable relief.4 If the strike involves Common-
wealth employees, the public employer's chief legal officer or the
Attorney General must initiate an action for equitable relief in the
court of common pleas where the strike occurs or the commonwealth
court.42 This equitable relief may include injunctions but it is not
limited thereto.43 Only the public employer may seek relief to halt
a public employee strike. Private individuals have no standing.4
3. Prohibited Strikes by Employees Permitted to Strike
Other than guards and court personnel, all Act 195 employees are
permitted to strike.45 However, these employees may strike only
after mandatory" impasse procedures are utilized and exhausted. 7
of persons on the employer's premises. Id. § 1101.604(3). The Act requires that "guards" not
be placed in units with other public employees. Id. However, the term "guards" is not so clear
and free from ambiguity as to obviate the need for judicial interpretations. Falls Township,
Bucks County v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 494, 322 A.2d 412 (1974). For
example, township school crossing guards whose main function was to aid school children on
safe passage to school were not "guards." Id.
All court employees having a relationship with the judicial system's functioning are also
prohibited from striking. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). This
refers not only to row office employees, but to all court-related employees who by statute are
subject to a court's or judge's hiring, firing, and supervision of their duties and responsibili-
ties. Washington County v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 315, 364 A.2d 519
(1976). Among the row offices are the register of wills, sheriff, prothonotary, clerk of courts,
domestic relations, district attorney, orphan's court, common pleas court, probation, public
defender and law library. See Decker, Some Problems Facing Administrators in the Organiza-
tion of Courthouse Employees in Pennsylvania, 5 J. CoL.Ec. NEG. PUB. SEC. 277, 282 (1976);
Decker, Courthouse Employee Organization in Pennsylvania-Some Recent Afterthoughts,
6 J. COLLEC. NEG. PUB. SEC. 89 (1977). This includes the judge's personal staff and administra-
tive and probation personnel. County of Washington v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 26 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 315, 364 A.2d 519 (1976). In lieu of a strike right, guards and court employees
are required to submit to binding arbitration where a negotiation impasse occurs. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.805-806 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
41. Id. § 1101.1001.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Ailing v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 13 Lycoming County 58, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d
624 (1974); Hilinski v. Christy, 58 Erie County 61 (1974).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
46. United Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1002-.1003. Sections 1101.801 and 1101.802 detail the
collective bargaining impasse procedures to be utilized and exhausted prior to commencing
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Moreover, where negotiation and impasse procedures are still in use
when a strike commences, the public employer is obligated to seek
an injunction halting the strike."
This also means that strikes during a collective bargaining agree-
ment's existence are prohibited. For example, wildcat strikes or any
other form of strike engaged in without resorting to the Act's im-
passe procedures are unlawful. 9 A public employer is entitled to
freedom from strikes until a collective bargaining agreement ex-
pires.50
A public employer is also protected from strikes where the em-
ployees are not yet organized and covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, or after an exclusive bargaining representative is certi-
fied and the first collective bargaining agreement is to be negoti-
ated. Strikes are prohibited in these two situations until after ex-
haustion of Act 195's mandatory impasse procedures.5 In neither of
these instances can the employees utilize and exhaust these proce-
dures until a collective bargaining agreement exists. Consequently,
no strike right arises.
4. Exhaustion of Impasse Procedures Prior to a Strike
Prior to engaging in any strike, public employees must utilize and
exhaust Act 195's impasse procedures.2 These procedures involve
mediation 3 and fact finding." When an impasse exists, mediation
can occur if the parties request it twenty one days after negotiations
have commenced 5 or if the 150 day period expires and the parties
any strike. These impasse procedures include mediation and fact finding. Id. §§ 1101.801-
.802.
48. South Allegheny School Dist. v. South Allegheny Education Ass'n, 120 P.L.J. 48, 55
Pa. D. & C.2d 94 (1971).
49. Somerset County Comm'rs, 2 P.P.E.R. 60 (1972). For example, resignations as a group
constitute a strike. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. Pleasant Valley School Dist., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d
637 (1974). Also, a public employee resigning during the term of his/her contract as part of a
strike engages in unprotected activity. School Dist. of City of Scranton v. Scranton Fed'n of
Teachers, Local No. 1147, 445 Pa. 155, 282 A.2d 235 (1971).
50. School Dist. of City of Scranton v. Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 1147, 445
Pa. 155, 282 A.2d 235 (1971).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1002-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
52. Id.; see also United Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority,
22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
54. Id. § 1101.802.
55. Id. § 1101.801. However, mediation must be requested no later than 150 days prior to
the "budget submission date" if an impasse exists. Id.
1978-79
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immediately inform the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation in writ-
ing.56
Once mediation begins, it continues until the parties reach an
agreement57 or until it is terminated by one of two situations. The
Bureau of Mediation is required to notify, the PLRB twenty days
after mediation commences or no later than 130 days prior to the
"budget submission date."" After the Bureau of Mediation's notifi-
cation in these two situations, the PLRB may exercise its discretion
to continue mediation, appoint a fact finding panel, or terminate
mediation. 5 If mediation is terminated by the PLRB, the public
employees may strike. 0 However, if mediation is continued or a fact
finding panel appointed, the public employees must exhaust these
procedures before striking.
The fact finding panel, consisting of either one or three mem-
bers,' has the power to hold hearings, take oral or written testi-
mony, and issue subpoenas.2 The panel's findings of fact and rec-
ommendations must be sent to the PLRB and both parties within
forty days after the date the Bureau of Mediation originally notified
the PLRB that an impasse existed. 3 From this point the parties
have ten days to accept the panel's findings and recommendations,
The "budget submission date" means:[T]he date by which under the law or practice a public employer's proposed budget,
or budget containing proposed expenditures applicable to such public employer is
submitted to the legislature or other similar body for final action. For the purposes of
this act, the budget submission date for the Commonwealth shall be February 1 of each
year and for a nonprofit organization or institution the last day of its fiscal year.
Id. § 1101.301(12).
56. Id. § 1101.801.
57. Id. § 1101.802.
58. Id.
59. Id. See note 60 infra.
60. See Bellefonte Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Bellefonte Area School Dist., 9 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973). Here the Bureau of Mediation notified the PLRB that
no agreement had been reached and the PLRB declined to appoint a fact finding panel. The
court said: (1) it was discretionary for the PLRB to appoint or not to appoint a fact finding
panel; (2) the parties were not obligated to urge the PLRB to appoint a fact finding panel;
and (3) that this did not make a strike illegal if the PLRB did not in its discretion appoint a
fact finding panel. Id.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The Commonwealth pays
one-half of the fact finding panel's cost. The remaining one-half is divided between the
parties. Moreover, the PLRB must establish rules and regulations under which fact finding
panels operate, including compensation for panel members. Id. § 1101.802(4).
62. Id. § 1101.802.
63. Id. § 1101.802(1).
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in whole or in part, 4 or these findings and recommendations are
made public.65 Not less than five days nor more than ten days after
publication, the parties must again inform the PLRB of acceptance
or nonacceptance16 If no acceptance, the public employees may
strike. Refusal of either the public employee or the public employer
representative to submit to Act 195's impasse procedures consti-
tutes a refusal to bargain in good faith and will be considered an
unfair labor practice, 7 which allows either party or the PLRB to file
a complaint.
In addition to the mediation and fact finding procedures, the
parties may voluntarily submit their dispute to binding arbitra-
tion,69 which will resolve the dispute and determine the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. The dissatisfied party may not
strike,70 but may appeal the arbitrator's award to court.
Act 195's impasse procedure envisions bargaining for a reasonable
time, mediation for a reasonable time, and finally resort to fact
finding. The overall objective is to obtain a settlement before the
public employer's budget must be submitted. Consequently, nego-
tiations must be scheduled so that the budget can be prepared for
submission by the date required.7
5. Permissible Strikes after Exhaustion of Impasse Procedures
Act 195 does not prohibit strikes occurring after impasse proce-
dures have been completely utilized and exhausted unless they
64. Id. § 1101.802(2).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1101.802(3).
67. Id. § 1101.803; see also §§ 1101.1201(a)(5), 1101.1201(b)(3).
68. Id. § 1101.803.
69. Id. § 1101.804.
70. See South Allegheny School Dist. v. South Allegheny Educ. Ass'n, 120 P.L.J. 48, 55
Pa. D. & C.2d 94 (1971).
71. What is the effect of failure to comply with. the specified time limits? The answer,
"not much." No one seems to pay much attention to time constraints. Act 195 speaks of the
utilization and exhaustion of impasse procedures prior to commencing any strike and not to
the adherence of schedules. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
Consequently, the failure to use and exhaust impasse procedures is the critical item in any
case. See United Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975); Bellefonte Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Bellefonte
Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973). The designated negotiation
and impasse procedures must be utilized to exhaustion prior to initiating any lawful strike.
United Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct.
25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
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create "a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or
welfare of the public."73 Through this the legislature has indicated
its willingness to accept certain inconveniences caused by public
employee strikes.7' The test for "clear and present danger"" does
not contemplate consideration of effects normally incident to a
strike"8 until they accumulate, continue too long, or are aggravated
by an unexpected development." For a strike to be enjoined it must
be in progress 78 and there must be a finding that the danger or threat
is real and that a strong likelihood exists that it will occur. 79 The fact
that the strike was at one time in progress is insufficient for the
injunction to be issued 80 since the injunction's purpose is to avert
present danger."'
In enjoining public employee strikes, the courts consider a variety
of factors including:
1. The population percentage affected.12
2. The affected group's ability to function normally."
3. The impossibility of completing a program mandated by
law or another requirementA'
73. Id.
74. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78); see Bristol Township
Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 463,322 A.2d 767 (1974).
76. See note 75 supra.
77. Id.
78. Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 16
Pa. Commw. Ct. 50, 329 A.2d 292 (1974). However, if a strike occurs after the complaint is
filed, the court's jurisdiction attaches and the strike may be enjoined. See Philadelphia Fed'n
of Teachers v. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973). Act 195's major purpose
and particularly its requirement that a strike must actually be in progress to be enjoined was
to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes before resorting to the courts. Commonwealth v.
Ryan, 459 Pa. 148, 327 A.2d 351 (1974).
79. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 291 A.2d
120 (1972).
80. School Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Fed'n of Teachers, Local 400, 31 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 461, 376 A.2d 1021 (1977); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 459 Pa. 148, 327 A.2d 351 (1974).
81. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 291 A.2d
120 (1972).
82. E.g., teacher strikes and the population percentage denied an education. See Bristol
Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d
767 (1974). See also Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204, 301 A.2d
405 (1973); Montour School District, 7 P.P.E.R. 322 (1976).
83. E.g., teacher strikes adversely affecting working mothers. See Bristol Township Educ.
Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 767 (1974).
84. E.g., teacher strikes and the inability to complete the required number of instruc-
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4. Loss of governmental funds. 5
5. Wages lost by non-striking employees who are prevented
from working.88
6. Program and service disruption adversely affecting com-
munity sectors most in need of these. 7
7. Community disruption by potential or actual violence."
Disruption of routine procedures89 or the ability of non-striking su-
pervisory employees to provide the services'" are not considered suf-
ficient.
To enjoin a strike, the public employer must initiate an action for
equitable relief in the court of common pleas where the strike oc-
curs."' If the strike involves Commonwealth employees, the public
employer's chief legal officer or the Attorney General must institute
an equitable relief action in the court of common pleas where the
tional days mandated by state law. See Commonwealth v. Union Area School Bd., 24 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 442, 356 A.2d 866 (1976); Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol
Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 767 (1974); Root v. Northern Cambria School
Dist., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 174, 309 A.2d 175 (1973).
85. E.g., teacher strikes and school districts losing state subsidies. See Bristol Township
Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 767 (1974);
Bellefonte Area Bd. of Educ. v. Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass;n, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 210, 304 A.2d
922 (1973); Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 291
A.2d 120 (1972).
86. E.g., teacher strikes where cafeteria workers and bus drivers lose wages because they
are prevented from working. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Town-
ship, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 767 (1974).
87. E.g., teacher strikes disrupting programs for the mentally retarded, those with visual,
hearing, or speech disabilities, and senior citizens. See Blackhawk School Dist. v. Pennsyl-
vania State Educ. Ass'n, 74 Pa. D. & C.2d 665 (1976); Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School
Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 767 (1974). Public patient care
may also be involved. Courts have said that employees in county institutions who feed or give
medical attention to patients who are unable to control their bodily functions should not be
permitted to strike. Mercer County v. United Steel Workers of America, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d
631 (1973).
88. E.g., teacher strikes and increased gang activity. See Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers
v. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973).
89. E.g., teacher strikes and the disruption of routine school administrative procedures,
including cancellation of extracurricular activities and sports. See Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v.
Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972).
90. E.g., a strike by municipal water and sewer authority employees. Highland Sewer and
Water Authority v. Local Union 459, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 564 (1973).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). This may include but is
not limited to appropriate injunctions. Id.
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strike occurs or commonwealth court."2 Only a public employer can
invoke the court's jurisdiction. 3 Third parties (such as the public
represented by parents, pupils, or ministers) cannot invoke the
court's jurisdiction.94 Prior to filing any complaint a copy must be
furnished to the defendant as provided in the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure." Moreover, before granting any relief, a hearing
must be held," and as discussed above, the strike can be enjoined
only if the court finds that it creates "a clear and present danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public."97 On appeal,
the scope of review is limited to determining whether reasonable
grounds existed for the relief ordered by the lower court." Unless it
is plain that no grounds existed or that the rules of law relied on
were palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, it must be affirmed.99
Courts are only empowered to grant equitable relief to end a pub-
lic employee strike. For a court to have any further equity jurisdic-
tion, there must be an additional statutory grant. Consequently,
courts are without power to compel the parties to submit to binding
arbitration00 or to impose any judicial settlement. 0' An unfair labor
92. Id.
93. Id. §§ 1101.301(1). Act 195 defines "public employer" as:
[Tihe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including school
districts and any officer, board, commission, agency, authority, or other instrumental-
ity thereof and any nonprofit organization or institution and any charitable, religious,
scientific, literary, recreational, health, educational or welfare institution receiving
grants or appropriations from local, State or Federal governments but shall not include
employers covered or presently subject to coverage under the act of June 1, 1937 (P.L.
1168), as amended, known as the "Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act," the act of July
5, 1935, Public Law 198, 74th Congress, as amended, known as the "National Labor
Relations Act,"
Id. § 1101.301(1).
94. Alling v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 13 Lycoming County 58, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d
624 (1974); Hilinski v. Christy, 58 Erie County 62 (1974).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974); Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972).
99. Id.
100. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 291 A.2d
120 (1972). Moreover, during an impasse, Act 195 makes binding arbitration available as an
option for resolving the dispute. However, this is voluntarily entered into and must be specifi-
cally selected through agreement by the parties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78).
101. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974).
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practice by a public employer is not a defense to a prohibited
strike. 102
Act 195's limited strike right was never intended to permit a
severe disruption of community services. Act 195's policy of promot-
ing orderly and constructive relationships between public employers
and employees'013 is subject, however, to the public's right to keep
inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety, and welfare.°4 This
conforms with Act 195's standard for enjoining strikes. 05
6. Failure to Comply with Injunctions
Act 195 provides public employers remedies for failure of either
public employees or employee organizations to comply with injunc-
tions.'06 Should a public employee refuse to comply with an injunc-
tion, the public employer must initiate a contempt action. 0 7 If
found guilty, the employee may be suspended, demoted, or dis-
charged at the public employer's discretion.' 8 The public employee
may also be subject to a fine or imprisonment. 0 Where an employee
organization willfully disobeys an injunction it may also be penal-
ized." 0 Each day of contempt may result in a fine fixed by the
court's discretion."' Fines" 2 or imprisonment of union officials have
been considered proper where a strike continued despite its danger
to the public welfare.
In fixing a fine's amount or ordering imprisonment for contempt,
the court must consider, but is not limited to, the following:
1. Any public employer unfair labor practices committed dur-
ing the collective bargaining process.
2. The extent of the willful defiance or resistance to the
court's order.
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1004 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
103. Id. § 1101.101.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1101.1003.
106. Id. §§ 1101.1005-.1010.
107. Id. § 1101.1005.
108. Id. However, the public employer in taking this disciplinary action cannot commit
an unfair labor practice. If an unfair labor practice is committed, it negates the public
employer's action. See id. § 1201(a)(1)-(4).
109. Id. § 1101.1008.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 1101.1009. See also Port Authority Allegheny County v. Division 85, Amalgam-
ated Transit Union, 122 P.L.J. 189, 196 (1974).
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3. The strike's impact on the public's health, safety, or wel-
fare.
4. The ability of the employee or employee organization to
pay a fine." 3
After a strike ends, the parties may voluntarily request that the
court reduce or suspend any fines or penalties imposed."4 This may
be desirable to promote harmonious labor relations between the
parties.
7. Employee Compensation During a Strike
Act 195 specifically prohibits public employees from obtaining
pay or other compensation from the public employer during a
strike."5 This is analogous to recent Pennsylvania decisions dealing
with a collective bargaining agreement's expiration."6 These cases
indicate that when a collective bargaining agreement expires, a
public employer's obligation to continue compensation or conform
with expired contract provisions may also be limited."7 They hold
that, when the collective bargaining agreement expires, wages or
other economic benefits may not be required to be continued under
certain circumstances. 8 Furthermore, the duty to arbitrate does
not continue for grievances arising during the hiatus period," and
a maintenance of membership clause contained in an expired col-
lective bargaining agreement is unenforceable. 20
8. Picketing and Other Concerted Activities
Picketing generally involves advertising, the existence of a labor
dispute and the union's version of its merits. Peaceful picketing at
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1009 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). See Gould, Civil or
Criminal Contempt Proceedings for Striking Teachers, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 269, 278-79 (1974).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1010 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
115. Id. § 1101.1006. This includes wages, salaries, fringe benefits and all other types of
compensation received for services rendered. Id.
116. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 394 A.2d 946 (Pa. 1978); Pa. L.R.B. v.
Williamsport Area School District, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355, 370 A.2d 1241 (1977). See also
Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 458 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d 47 (1974).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355,
370 A.2d 1241 (1977). See also Decker, Arbitrability of Public Sector Grievances After Expira-
tion of a Contract, 7 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 287 (1978).
120. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 458 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d 47 (1974).
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a location generally open to the public is protected free speech,
absent factors relating to the purpose or manner of the picketing.
Act 195 permits picketing related to a lawful strike 2' or without a
strike. 2 However, public employees, other than those engaged in a
nonprohibited strike, are required to cross picket lines.2 3 Failure to
do so subjects these employees to a finding that they are engaged
in a prohibited strike2 4 which may warrant fines, imprisonment, or
employee discipline. 25
A problem arising under Act 195 is the enjoining of picketing.
Public employers may desire to enjoin the activity where it becomes
violent, destructive, or prevents ingress and egress, but Act 195 does
not provide a specific procedure to do so.'26 The Act addresses only
strikes, not the consequences of a strike, and picketing may be
considered such a consequence. Therefore, Act 195's "clear and
present danger" test for enjoining strikes is of little use in this con-
text. 27 It is inconceivable, however, that the legislature intended to
prohibit courts from enjoining illegal picketing. To argue otherwise
would indicate that the legislature thought a limited right to strike
was appropriate for certain public officials, yet permitted unlimited
picketing without remedy. This is inconsistent with Pennsylvania's
labor relations statutory scheme.
The Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1937, 28 section 206d(d), pro-
vides that courts may enjoin labor disputes involving violence and
property destruction, 29 and a public employer is not specifically
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
122. Id. § 1101.401.
123. Id. § 1101.1101. This also applies in situations where the strike is illegal or picketing
occurs without a strike.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. §§ 1101.1001-.1003.
127. Id. § 1101.1003.
128. The Act of June 2, 1937, Pub. L. No. 1198 (Labor Anti Injunction Act), established
procedures for obtaining injunctions in labor disputes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 206a-r
(Purdon 1964).
129. Id. § 206d(d). This section provides:
Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined, an employe, or employes
acting in concert, or a labor organization, or the members, officers, agents, or repre-
sentatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for such organization, seize, hold,
damage or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery, or other property of the employer
with the intention of compelling the employer to accede to any demands, conditions,
or terms of employment, or for collective bargaining.
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excluded from the Act's coverage. 30 The Act defines both
"employer"13 and "labor dispute' '132 in broad terms which appear
to encompass public employer and employee labor disputes and the
picketing arising out of those disputes. The test for enjoining picket-
ing under this Act is "irreparable harm,' ' 33 rather than "clear and
present danger" as provided under Act 195 for strikes.3 4 Therefore,
it may be possible to enjoin illegal public sector picketing under the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Labor Anti Injunction Act.
9. The Effectiveness of Public Sector No-Strike Clauses
In the private sector, a no-strike clause is generally regarded as
the quid pro quo for a binding arbitration provision, 3 although the
NLRA does not require that the collective bargaining agreement
contain an arbitration clause. 3 This is intended to protect the pri-
vate sector employer during the life of a collective bargaining agree-
ment from a strike. If a strike occurs, the private employer has a
remedy to obtain an injunction compelling arbitration under the
contract. "I
130. For example, the PLRA excludes public employers. Id. § 211.3(c).
131. Id. § 206c(3)(g). This section defines "employer" to include: "master, and shall also
include natural persons, partnerships, unincorporated associations, joint-stock companies,
corporations for profit, corporations not for profit, receivers in equity, and trustees or receivers
in bankruptcy." Id. Certainly the use of the term "master" in the above definition includes
a public employer.
132. Id. § 206c(3)(c). This section defines "labor dispute" as:
[Any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment or concerning employment
relations or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer
and employe, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employe, and regardless of whether or not the employes are
on strike with the employer. Id.
133. Id. § 206i(b).
134. Id. § 1101.1003.
135. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564
(1960). See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
137. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); see also
Buffalo Forge Co. v. N.L.R.B., 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Lowden & Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes,
Arbitration Policy, and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreements: An Analysis of Buffalo
Forge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 633 (1977).
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Unlike the NLRA, Act 195 requires the inclusion of a binding
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 3 ' This ne-
gates the private sector's quid pro quo rationale. Moreover, Act 195
prohibits all strikes during the collective bargaining agreement's
term.' As a result, the inclusion of a no-strike clause in a Pennsyl-
vania public sector contract appears unnecessary and may be con-
sidered surplusage. However, a no-strike clause not limited solely to
strikes may be effective if drawn limiting certain public employee
concerted activites. For example, if the no-strike clause includes a
picketing limitation during the collective bargaining agreement's
term the public employer may be protected. Violation of such a
clause may enable the employer to seek an injunction compelling
arbitration under the contract. This may enable the employer to
prevent all picketing and other concerted activities, not just illegal
activity curtailed by an injunction. In any event, the inclusion of
such a clause must be bargained, which may require the public
employer to make concessions in other areas that may be considered
unwarranted in light of such a clause's value.
10. The Current Status of Teacher Strikes
Throughout the short history of Act 195, teacher strikes have
posed an especially vexing problem,4 0 although recent decisions
suggest that teachers' rights to strike may be more limited than that
of other public employees. One of the critical factors courts consider
in issuing injunctions involving prolonged teacher strikes is the
school district's requirement to provide 180 days of instruction.''
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79).
139. Id. §§ 1101.1001-.1002.
140. Since the passage of Act 195 teacher strikes have occurred as follows:
1970-71-35
1971-72-29
1972-73-36
1973-74-30
1974-75-37
1975-76-53
1976-77-42
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TEACHER STRIKE REPORT 1976-1977 PENNSYLVANIA
PUBuc SCHooLs 15-22 (May 1977).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,"§ 15-1501 (Purdon 1962). This section provides:
All public kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools shall be kept open each
school year for at least one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction for pupils. No days
on which the schools are closed shall be counted as days taught, and no time shall be
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The 180 day instructional requirement is a legal standard below
which a school district cannot fall if it is to qualify for governmental
subsidies. Inadequate instruction and threatened loss of subsidies
may compel teachers to return to work."'
If a school board has a positive duty to schedule 180 days of
instruction, then the time and length of a teacher strike may be
limited. It can be argued, then, that an effective teacher strike right
does not exist. For example, if 180 days of instruction must be
provided prior to the school year's end and the school board may in
its discretion adjust the schedule, teachers can strike throughout
the Fall without affecting anyone. Then, when the last day for meet-
ing the 180 day requirement occurs in late Fall, the school district
easily obtains an injunction for a strike that has never actually
affected it. By adjusting the school calender in this manner, the
school district is not influenced by a strike's pressure, the com-
munity is not disrupted, and the teachers' strike right is thwarted.
B. Pennsylvania's Collective Bargaining by Police and Firemen's
Act (Act 111)11
As a collective bargaining statute, Act 111 lacks many provisions
present in Act 195. For example, Act 111 has no specific provisions
for representation elections or unfair labor practices. Recently, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted these deficiencies in the repre-
sentation area. "' Moreover, Act 111 contains little, if any, parallel
counted as a pupil session for any activity to which admission is charged. Unless
otherwise provided by ,this act, the board of school directors in any district or joint
board may keep such other schools or departments as it may establish open during
such time as it may direct.
Twenty days of actual teaching shall constitute a school month.
Id.
142. Pittenger v. Union Area School Bd., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 442, 356 A.2d 866 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Leechburg Area School Bd., 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 140, 339 A.2d 149 (1975);
Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 463,
322 A.2d 767 (1974); Root v. Northern Cambria School Dist., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 174, 309
A.2d 175 (1973); Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 387,
291 A.2d 125 (1972).
Consequently, the limited strike right for teachers has been further dissipated by the 180
day requirement. The teacher strike right is thwarted if the school district adjusts its school
calendar by distributing instructional days and vacations differently. Thus, the right is at
best illusory. The calendar adjustment is perhaps a small inconvenience compared to any
teacher strike's effect on the community.
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
144. Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d
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language from the NLRA. Act ill's employees are still subject to
the Anti-Public Employee Strike Act prohibiting public sector
strikes.'45 However, neither Act 111 nor the Anti-Public Employee
Strike Act prohibit police or firemen from picketing or engaging in
other concerted activities;' 6 the only activity prohibited is strikes.'47
Police and firemen's concerted activities may also reach levels re-
quiring injunctions. Again, no Act 111 procedure exists for enjoining
such activity. One approach may be to rely upon the rationale ad-
vanced under the Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act dis-
cussed above. Another is to read Act 111 in pari materia4" with the
Labor Anti-Injunction Act. This rationale was applied to Act 111 in
Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. "I where
Act 111 was found in pari materia with the PLRA regarding the
PLRB's responsibility for police and firemen representation elec-
tions. Under either approach, a public employer should be able to
enjoin illegal picketing or other concerted activity.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of any strike legislation for public employees
must balance strike rights of employees in essential and nonessen-
tial services. Certainly the government has a legitimate interest in
curbing strikes that may seriously affect the public and Pennsyl-
vania's public employee laws attempt to achieve this end. Act 195
affords a limited strike right for certain employees and to promote
prompt settlements, employees must exhaust a specified set of im-
passe procedures before striking. In addition to strikes, Act 195
employees may engage in picketing and other concerted activities.
Act 111 prohibits police and firemen from striking, but they are
not prohibited from picketing or engaging in other concerted activi-
ties. These activities are not enjoinable unless they create among
other things violence- or destruction to the public employer.
259 (1977); see Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Police and Firemen, 16 DUQ. L. REv.
185 (1978).
145. The Act of June 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 1183 (Strikes by Public Employees), prohibited
strikes by all public employees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 215.1-.5 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1977-
78).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 215.2.
148. See note 12 supra.
149. 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977).
1978-79

